Can Other People Make You Less Creative? by Gabora, Liane
Gabora, L. (2015). Can Other People Make You Less Creative? 
Psychology Today (online). https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mindbloggling/201502/can-
other-people-make-you-less-creative 	  
 
Can Other People Make You Less Creative? 
 
Liane Gabora 
 
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia 
Okanagan Campus, Arts Building, 333 University Way, Kelowna BC, V1V 1V7, CANADA 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explains in layperson’s terms how an agent-based model was 
used to investigate the hypothesis that culture evolves more effectively when 
novelty-generating creative processes are tempered by imitation processes 
that preserve proven successful ideas. Using EVOC, an agent-based model 
of cultural evolution we found that (1) the optimal ratio of inventing to 
imitating ranged from 1:1 to 2:1 depending on the fitness function, (2) there 
was a trade-off between the proportion of creators to conformers and how 
creative the creators were, and (3) when agents in increased or decreased 
their creativity depending on the success of their latest creative efforts, they 
segregated into creators and conformers, and the mean fitness of ideas 
across the society was higher. It is tentatively suggested that through the 
unconscious use of social cues, members of a society self-organizes to 
achieve a balanced mix of creators and conformers. 
 
 
Do you feel more creative in some social environments than others, or even when you 
are completely alone? Although it is widely believed that stimulating environments 
enhance creativity there is evidence that this is not always the case; indeed it turns out 
that creativity can be enhanced by spending time in an isolation tank blocked off from 
sensory stimulation entirely (Forgays & Forgays, 1992; Norlander, Bergman, & Archer, 
1998; Vartanian, & Suedfeld, 2011). This suggests that social stimulation may not 
always enhance creativity, and may even decrease it. 
 
The idea that social environments could interfere with creativity came from thinking 
about creativity in the context of culture as an evolutionary process. Evolutionary 
processes require a balance between exploratory processes that generate new variants 
and conservative processes that perpetuate ‘tried and true’ variants. This is the case in 
biological evolution, and it seemed reasonable that it would also be the case for cultural 
evolution. In other words: people may send out social signals to each other that ensure 
that creativity---the process that fuels cultural novelty---is properly balanced by 
conformity,i.e., imitation of ideas that have already proven to be successful. 
 
The notion that society might aim to temper novelty-generating creativity with novelty-
perpetuating imitation flies in the face of the widespread assumption that more creativity 
is necessarily better. It goes without saying that creativity is a good thing, and that 
everyone should be creative. Or does it? Sure, our capacity for self-expression, for 
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finding practical solutions to problems of survival, and coming up with aesthetically 
pleasing objects that delight the senses, all stem from the creative power of the human 
mind. But there are drawbacks to creativity.  
 
First, creative people tend to be more emotionally unstable and prone to affective 
disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder. They have a higher incidence of 
‘schizotypal’ leanings than other segments of the population. They are also more prone 
to abuse drugs and alcohol, and to commit suicide. So there is a ‘dark side’ to creativity 
(Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010). 
 
Second, a creative solution to one problem often generates other problems, or 
unexpected negative side effects that may only become apparent after much has been 
invested in the creative solution. There is a cultural version of what in biology is referred 
to as epistasis, where what is optimal with respect to one part depends on what is done 
with respect to another part. Once both parts of a problem have been solved in a 
mutually beneficial way, too much creativity can cause these ‘co-adapted’ partial 
solutions to break down. 
 
Third, in a group of interacting individuals, only a fraction of them need be creative for 
the benefits of creativity to be felt throughout the group. Uncreative people can reap the 
benefits of the ideas of ‘creative types’ without having to withstand the ‘dark side’ of 
creativity by simply imitating, or admiring them. Few of us know how to build a computer, 
or write a symphony, or a novel, but they are nonetheless ours to use and enjoy when 
we please. An excess of creative types all completely absorbed in their own creative 
process might effectively insulate themselves and block the rapid diffusion of the best 
ideas.  
 
This opens up some interesting questions. Would it be good for the society as a whole if 
everyone were highly creative? In order for a culture to evolve optimally, what is the 
ideal ratio of creators to imitators, and how creative should the ’creative types’ be? And 
perhaps most interesting of all: do people upgrade or downgrade how creative they are 
in response to social cues they receive from other people about the perceived value of 
their creative outputs?  
 
My colleagues and I are investigating these questions using a computer model of 
cultural evolution. I'll begin by telling you a bit about the computer model itself. Then I’ll 
explain the experiments that led up to the experiments that explored the hypothesis that 
people socially regulate each others’ creativity. Finally, I’ll explain the social regulation 
experiments themselves. 
 
THE COMPUTER MODEL  
 
The current model's predecessor was called Meme and Variations or MAV (Gabora, 
1995). Its name is a pun on the musical form, ‘theme and variations'. MAV was the 
earliest computer program to model culture as an evolutionary process in its own right. 
MAV was inspired by the genetic algorithm (GA), a search technique that finds solutions 
to complex problems by generating a 'population' of candidate solutions (through 
processes akin to mutation and recombination), selecting the best, and repeating until a 
satisfactory solution is found. 
The computer model is composed of an artificial society of agents in a two-dimensional 
grid-cell world. Agents consist of (1) a neural network, which encodes ideas for actions 
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and detects trends in what constitutes an effective action, and (2) a body, which 
implements their ideas as actions. The agents can do two things: (1) invent ideas for 
new actions, and (2) imitate their neighbors' actions. The computer model enables us to 
investigate what happens to the diversity and effectiveness of actions in the artificial 
society over successive rounds (called ‘iterations') of invention and imitation. Since the 
ideas in the model are ideas for actions, diversity is measured by counting how many 
different actions are being implemented by the agents. Evolution in the biological sense 
is not taking place; the agents neither die nor have offspring. But evolution in the cultural 
sense is taking place through the generating and sharing of ideas for actions amongst 
agents, which over time leads to more effective actions. 
 
In MAV, all agents were equally capable of both inventing and imitating. In the latest 
version of the computer model called EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture), it is possible to 
vary how likely an agent is to invent versus imitate. 
 
A TYPICAL RUN  
 
Each iteration, every agent has the opportunity to (1) acquire an idea for a new action, 
either by imitation, copying a neighbor, or by invention, creating one anew, (2) update 
their knowledge about what constitutes an effective action, and (3) implement a new 
action. Effectiveness of actions starts out low because initially all agents are just 
standing still doing nothing. Soon some agent invents an action that has a higher 
effectiveness than doing nothing, and this action gets imitated, so effectiveness 
increases. Effectiveness increases further as other ideas get invented, assessed, 
implemented as actions, and spread through imitation. The diversity of actions initially 
increases due to the proliferation of new ideas, and then decreases as agents hone in 
on the fittest actions. Thus MAV successfully models how 'descent with modification' can 
occur in a cultural context. 
 
FIRST SET OF EXPERIMENTS: 
WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL RATIO OF EFFORT INVESTED IN CREATIVITY TO EFFORT 
INVESTED IN IMITATION? 
 
In the earliest version of this computer model (MAV), all agents were equally capable of 
both inventing and imitating (Gabora, 1995). It was possible to vary the probability that, 
in a given iteration, they would invent versus imitate. The agents are too rudimentary to 
suffer from depression or commit suicide, so it is just the other detrimental aspects of 
creativity listed above that we thought might play a role in these experiments. 
 
What the results showed was that if they all imitated each other all the time, nothing 
happened at all: everyone watched everyone else and no one did anything. If they all 
invented all the time, the progress of ideas was slow because they weren’t taking 
advantage of each other’s hard work. The optimal ratio of inventing to imitating was 
about 2:1. Of course, these results hold for just this little idealized world, and they may or 
may not be generalizable to the world at large. But they do ring true for many people, 
who say they spend about 2/3 of their time alone in their studio or office immersed in 
their work, and about 1/3 of their time talking or reading about or studying things related 
to their creative project. (Subsequent experiments showed that this ratio can be as low 
as 1:1 depending on the ‘fitness function’, i.e., the kind of task the agents had to solve.)  
 
SECOND SET OF EXPERIMENTS: 
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WHAT PROPORTION OF SOCIETY SHOULD BE CREATIVE, AND HOW CREATIVE 
SHOULD THEY BE? 
 
The finding that very high levels of creativity can be detrimental for society led to the 
hypothesis that there is an adaptive value to society's ambivalent attitude toward 
creativity; society as a whole may benefit from a distinction between the conventional 
workforce and what has been called a “creative class” (Florida, 2002). Using the new 
version of the computer model, EVOC we investigated how patterns of cultural evolution 
are affected by how numerous and creative the creators are. We conducted experiment 
that varied, not just the ratio of creators to imitators, but also the creativeness of the 
creators (Leijnen & Gabora, 2009). Each agent could be a pure imitator, a pure creator, 
or something in between. The pure imitators never invented; they simply copied the 
successful innovations of the creative agents. The creators were able to invent as well 
as well as imitate. The percentage of iterations in which they invented varied up to 100%. 
 
The results were provocative. We found that cultural diversity – that is, the number of 
different actions in the artificial society -- was positively correlated with both the 
percentage of creators, and their level of creativity. However, for cultural fitness or 
effectiveness, the situation was more complex. So long as the creative types weren’t 
THAT creative, the more of them there are, the better. But when the creative types were 
HIGHLY creative, the mean fitness of ideas across the society was higher if there were 
fewer of them. The results seemed to show that the more creative the creators are, the 
less numerous they should be. 
 
We then conducted more extensive investigations of these questions employing more 
detailed and sophisticated analytical methods. The amount of time it takes for the 
effectiveness of ideas across the artificial society to reach a threshold level of 
performance is affected by the creator to imitator ratio (C), and the creator innovation 
probability (p).  
 
The same general trends emerged. Cultural diversity was once again positively 
correlated with both the percentage of creators, and their level of creativity (Gabora & 
Leijnen, 2013). But when we looked at, not the variety of ideas, but how fit or effective 
they were, the pattern of results was more complicated. What we found was that if C is 
low the p should be high, but if C is high then p should be intermediate (Gabora & 
Firouzi, 2012). In other words, once again there was a tradeoff between how creative the 
creators were, and how many of them there should be. 
 
These results supported the hypothesis that too much creativity causes ‘co-adapted’ 
partial solutions to problems to break down (the ‘don’t fix it if it ain’t broke’ phenomenon). 
They also supported the hypothesis that creative types, while they are a necessary 
source of novelty, constitute pinholes in the fabric of culture that block the spread of 
ideas. An iteration spent inventing is an iteration not spent imitating, and imitation is 
extremely valuable. It’s not just a form of free-riding, nor just ‘the greatest compliment’, 
but an indispensable social mechanism that serves everyone. By simply copying the 
successful innovations of the creative types, imitators serve as a ’memory’ for preserving 
the fittest configurations. So, contrary to popular belief, it might not be best for the 
society as a whole if everyone were creative. 
 
THIRD SET OF EXPERIMENTS: 
HOW IS SOCIETY AFFECTED IF PEOPLE CAN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE THEIR 
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CREATIVITY IN RESPONSE TO SOCIAL SIGNALS?  
 
We then hypothesized that society as a whole might perform even better with the ability 
to adjust creativity in accordance with their perceived creative success, through 
mechanisms such as selective ostracization of deviant behaviour unless accompanied 
by the generation of valuable cultural novelty, and encouraging of successful creators. A 
first step in investigating this hypothesis was to determine whether it is algorithmically 
possible to increase the mean fitness of ideas in a society by enabling them to self-
regulate how creative they are. To test the hypothesis that the mean fitness of cultural 
outputs across society increases faster with social regulation (SR) than without it, we 
increased the relative frequency of invention for agents that generated superior ideas, 
and decreased it for agents that generated inferior ideas (Gabora & Tseng, 2014a). 
Each iteration, for each agent, the fitness of its current action relative to the mean fitness 
of actions for all agents at the previous iteration was assessed. If its action was fitter 
than the mean it created more, and if its action was less fit than the mean it imitated 
more. 
 
The typical pattern was observed with respect to the diversity, or number of different 
ideas: an increase as the space of possibilities is explored followed by a decrease as 
agents converge on fit actions. However, this pattern occurred earlier, and was more 
pronounced, in societies with SR than societies without it. Interestingly, the mean fitness 
of the cultural outputs in societies with SR was higher than that in societies without SR.  
 
Even more interestingly, the societies with SR ended up separating into two distinct 
groups: one that primarily invented, and one that primarily imitated. Thus the observed 
increase in fitness could indeed be attributed to increasingly pronounced individual 
differences in their degree of creative expression over the course of a run. Agents that 
generated superior cultural outputs had more opportunity to do so, while agents that 
generated inferior cultural outputs became more likely to propagate proven effective 
ideas rather than reinvent the wheel.  
 
We conducted another set of experiments in which agents were able to generate not just 
simple single-step actions but complex multi-step actions that were more like real-world 
actions such as dancing or tool-making (Gabora & Tseng, 2014b). The same general 
patterns emerged: the agents segregated into creators and conformers, and the mean 
fitness of actions across the society as a whole increased. 
 
These results don't show that this kind of segregation into creators and 
conformers actually takes place in real societies. What they suggest is that if this 
did happen it could have an adaptive benefit for society as a whole.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The computer model differs substantially from the real world, so any attempt to 
extrapolate these results should be taken with a grain of salt. The agents’ neural 
networks are so small that creative novelty is generated does not involve noticing and 
refining new kinds of connections the way it happens in real minds (Gabora, 2000). 
Moreover, in these simulations, unlike the real world, agents had only one task to 
accomplish. However, the results of these computer simulations are provocative, and 
inspire new ways of thinking about creativity. They show that societies may benefit as a 
	  	  
6	  
6	  
whole by self-organizing into a balanced mix of novelty generating creators and 
continuity perpetuating imitators, and lead to the speculation that this happens 
spontaneously in real societies. 
 
There are many speculative but fascinating implications of this research. It leads to the 
suggestion that the reason creative individuals often isolate themselves is not just to 
decrease disturbances so they can more fully concentrate on their art, but because 
isolation safeguards you from social signals to downgrade your creativity, which can 
negatively impact creative performance. It suggests that as societies become 
increasingly denser it may become increasingly difficult to isolate oneself from the cues 
by which people unconsciously socially regulate each other’s level of creativity. 
 
Another possibility, suggested by my colleague Kiley Hamlin, is that girls are more 
responsive to social cues to downgrade creativity than boys, which might prematurely 
streamline them into an “imitator” track. The more you imitate, the more you rely on 
imitation as a source of ideas and ways of doing things, so it becomes a vicious circle of 
sorts, and vice versa: the more you create, the more you keep the creative juices flowing 
and rely on your own creative processes as a source of not just new ideas, but pleasure.  
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